When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating …rms commit ex ante to ful…ll a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may …nd it pro…table to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order to deter ex post moral hazard, buyers may use di¤erent strategies depending on the extent to which quality dimensions are contractible, that is, veri…able by contracting parties and by courts. We consider a stylized repeated procurement framework in which a buyer awards a contract over time to two …rms with di¤erent e¢ ciency levels. If the contractor does not deliver the agreed level of performance the buyer may handicap the same …rm in the next competitive tendering. We prove that, under complete information, extremely severe handicapping never induces the contractor to ful…ll the quality requirement, rather the buyer …nds it optimal to punish the opportunistic …rm so as to make the pool of competitors more alike. In other words, when opportunistic behavior arises, the buyer should use handicapping to "level the playing …eld".
INTRODUCTION
When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating …rms commit ex ante to ful…ll a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may …nd it pro…table to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order to deter ex post moral hazard, when delivered quality is veri…able by a third part then a standard principal-agent model applies and an explicit contract can be speci…ed ex ante. However, there exist some goods or services whose quality is hard to verify, for example the services essentially based on a high human capital component like IT and consulting. When the contractor's performance consists essentially in the provision of human capital the buyer may …nd it hard, if not impossible, to prove objectively whether the contractor has exactly complied with the contractual duties. When quality is not veri…able a formal contract cannot be enforced by a third party, therefore it needs to be self-enforcing in order to be e¤ective.
Since procurement contracts are repeatedly awarded over time, reputation mechanisms may play a crucial role in providing dynamic incentives for contractors to ful…ll contractual clauses. A special form of reputation mechanism is to award a certain score to a participating …rm based on its past performance. For instance, the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation prescribes that "[p]ast performance should be an important element of every evaluation and contract award for commercial items. In a context of complete information and observable but non veri…able quality we allow the buyer to handicap a …rm that behaved opportunistically in the past. We consider a stylized repeated procurement framework in which a buyer awards a contract over time to two suppliers with di¤erent e¢ ciency levels. If the …rm did not provide satisfactory quality levels in a previously awarded contract the buyer may reduce at her discretion the score assigned to the tender submitted by a …rm in the future competitive tendering. We prove that extremely severe handicapping never induces the contractor to ful…ll the quality requirement, rather the buyer …nds it optimal to punish the opportunistic …rm so as to make the pool of competitors more alike. In other words, when opportunistic behavior arises, the buyer should use handicapping to "level the playing …eld".
In particular, we set up an in…nitely repeated game whose constituent (static) game is composed of three stages. At the …rst stage a simpli…ed version of the sealed-bid competitive tendering takes place: the buyer requires ful…llment of a minimal quality standard and two fully informed heterogenous …rms bid only over price. At the second stage, once awarded the contract, the contractor chooses the quality. At the last stage the buyer observes the e¤ective quality and decides whether to handicap.
We allow the buyer and the contractor to use a single period punishment. When no cheating on quality is observed no handicap is applied; otherwise the buyer handicaps the opportunistic contractor only in the next competitive tendering. On the other hand, the …rm does not cheat if no cheating and handicap has occurred until that moment, otherwise it delivers zero quality only for one period.
This paper shows that the optimal strategy for the buyer is imposing in the next competitive tendering a handicap equal to the e¢ cient …rm's cost advantage. In this scenario the bidders are symmetric and get the same score in the competitive tendering. Given a tie breaking rule awarding the contract to the e¢ cient …rm, a su¢ ciently patient e¢ cient contractor prefers not to shrink rather than win the next competitive tendering at a lower price. An extremely harsh handicap (that is equivalent to exclusion from the next competitive tendering) is not an optimal strategy for the buyer for two reasons. First, it implicitly awards the contract to the less e¢ cient …rm that will bid less aggressively and always deliver zero quality. Second, given this reaction by the less e¢ cient …rm, the e¢ cient contractor prefers to provide zero quality, lose the tendering for one period and then be reawarded the contract when the less e¢ cient …rm is handicapped. On the other hand, a handicap lower than the …rm's cost advantage is not an optimal strategy for the buyer as well. In this scenario the e¢ cient …rm still wins the competitive tendering by gaining a positive pro…t, therefore it has a lower incentive to deliver the required quality. In particular, the lower the handicap the less aggressive is the equilibrium bid and then lower is the procurer's utility.
Our paper shows that repeatedly awarded procurement contracts in which unveri…able quality dimensions are relevant can be reinterpreted as relational contracts between a buyer and a contractor that is threatened by a potentially less e¢ cient competitor. Relational contracts pioneered by MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) and re…ned by MacLeod (2003) and Levin (2003) consider non-veri…able performance dimensions. Since such contracts are not legally enforceable, they need to be self-enforcing in order to be e¤ective. These papers set up a in…nitely repeated interaction between a principal and an agent by assuming that the performance of the latter is non-veri…able. The main message is that a wage scheme composed of a …x and a discretionary payment depending on the performance usually characterizes an optimal self-enforcing contract. All these papers employ a trigger strategy as in Abreu (1988) in which the discretionary payment is used by the principal to punish the cheating agent with the worst equilibrium outcome. We do not introduce a direct punishment strategy as in MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) , MacLeod (2003) and Levin (2003) . Our punishment is indirect in the sense that it does not consist in a direct cost in the contractor's utility, rather we allow the buyer to alter the subsequent competitive tendering by reducing the score of the opportunistic contractor. A further contribution of this paper is that our punishment lasts only one period ("stick and carrot"). Such a strategy sounds more realistic in procurement markets where, unless a serious wrongdoing like corruption o rebury is committed, a buyer cannot resort to trigger strategies thus keeping any form of punishment alive from one speci…c moment onwards 2 . Our paper bears some ingredients from MacLeod (2003) that sets up a repeated framework in which the performance evaluation depends on the correlation between the principal's and the agent's beliefs. MacLeod, in fact, assumes that the agent's beliefs about his performance are correlated with the principal's ones. Our paper 2 Permanent punishments for serious wrongdoing are introduced in the Bidding Documents for Procurement of Goods prepared by the World Bank to be used for the procurement of goods through International Competitive Bidding (ICB). These guidelines are applied in projects that are …nanced in whole or in part by the World Bank. They incorporate the Guidelines for Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits. These documents prescribe that: " ..The Bank: ...(c) will cancel the portion of the loan allocated to a contract if it determines at any time that...the bene…ciary of the loan engaged in corrupt, fraudulent, collusive, or coercive practices during the procurement or the execution of that contract... (d) will sanction a …rm or individual, including declaring ineligible, either inde…nitely or for a stated period of time, to be awarded a Bank-…nanced contract if it at any time determines that the …rm has...engaged in corrupt, fraudulent, collusive, coercive or obstructive practices...in executing, a Bank-…nanced contract..." captures the case of perfect correlation.
To the best of our knowledge papers strictly related to past performance evaluation in repeated procurement are Kim (1998) , Doni (2006) and Spagnolo and Calzolari (2006) . Kim (1998) and Spagnolo and Calzolari (2006) assume an extreme handicap since the buyer is allowed to debar the opportunistic contractor from the subsequent competitive tenderings. All these papers model a repeated game in which the level of handicapping is exogenous, whereas we …nd the credible level of handicapping characterizing a self-enforcing agreement.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the static game, Section 3 …nds the static equilibrium, and Section 4 introduces the analysis of the repeated game. Section 5 concludes.
THE MODEL
Consider a buyer who awards a procurement project to one of two …rms i = 1; 2 by running a sealed-bid competitive tendering.
The cost of each bidder is:
The cost is …xed and it does not change according to the quality provided. It also includes the cost each …rm experiences in order to participate to the competitive tendering. We assumed 1 = ; 2 = with > , that is, …rm 1 is the most e¢ cient. (q i ) is the variable cost of providing quality q i . We follow Kim (1998) and assume that (:) is common to both …rms.
The pro…t of each …rm is:
where p i is the price paid by the buyer to …rm i that delivers quality q i at cost c i . We also assume that the buyer requires ful…llment of a minimal quality standard denoted by q. The level q becomes the quality bided in the competitive tendering by both the …rms. Once awarded the competitive tendering the …rm may shrink on quality and depart from q. To represent this scenario, we de…ne the e¤ective quality as q i = q m, with m = f0; qg. The variable cost function respects the following conditions:
0 (:) 0, 00 (:) 0, 0 (0) = 0, (0) = 0, in particular there exists some points along (:) with slope lower than one 3 . Also, we assume > (q): …rm 1 is much more e¢ cient than …rm 2. This assumption will be fundamental for the result of the paper, nevertheless it will not a¤ect the quality of our results.
The utility function of the buyer is as follows:
We assume that: i) the buyer perfectly observes the quality and the costs of the …rms, and ii) the …rms are fully informed. Assumption i) is in line with the common idea that a procurer is more informed on the cost of the …rm than a standard regulator 4 . Although the buyer knows the costs of the …rms she needs to run an competitive tendering to award the project. This apparently counterintuitive assumption actually …ts many competitive tendering where the buyer knows ex-ante the e¢ ciency of the bidders. This is the case of those procurement acquisitions repeated over time in which bidders are in general always the same and the buyer runs the competitive tendering only because mandatory by the law. Let us introduce the three-stage static game G that will be the constituent game for the in…nitely repeated framework introduced in the Section 4. The timing of G is the following:
First stage A reduced version of the sealed-bid competitive tendering in Burget and Che (2004) takes place. The buyer requires ful…llment of a minimal quality standard denoted by q. When …rms accept to take part to the competitive tendering they automatically commit to bid quality q, therefore competitive bidding is only over price. Firms submit their bids simultaneously and noncooperatively. The highest score (or the lowest price) awards the competitive tendering. In the case of the same score the buyer uses a tie-breaking rule awarding the contract to the most e¢ cient …rm (…rm 1) 5 .
Second stage The contractor decides the e¤ective level of quality and may depart from the required level.
Third stage The buyer decides whether to handicap by an amount h the scoring rule of the opportunistic contractor in the next competitive tendering.
THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE STATIC GAME
We solve by backward induction. At the third stage the buyer simply decides the level of handicap, h > 0. Since handicapping will be e¤ective from the next period, in the this section we can only focus on the second and the …rst stage. We employ the technical assumption that when handicapping is applied it is assumed 2 (q) h. This assumption does not a¤ect the quality of the results 6 .
Second stage: optimal e¤ective quality
Once the competitive tendering has been awarded the contractor faces the following maximization problem:
solving w.r.t. m the solution is:
this means that m = q. In the static game the contractor has an incentive not to deliver quality at all. The optimal quality will be q i = 0. Since the static game ends at the third stage each contractor will behave opportunistically regardless the handicap.
First stage: competitive tendering
Given the …xed level of quality required by the contract, when …rm i is not handicapped it bids under the following scoring rule:
On the other hand, when it is handicapped its scoring rule is:
Since quality is not-contractible (because not-veri…able) the strategy of handicapping is fully discretional and it does not need to be enforced by a court: the buyer may punish as she prefers right because a court can not do that 7 . Following Burguet and Cheb (2004) we de…ne the bidding advantage of …rm i over …rm 2 as:
Since we are assuming the ful…llment of a minimal quality standard q and identical variable cost, then the bidding advantage of …rm 1, when it is handicapped, becomes:
On the other hand, since we allows either …rm to be handicapped, the bidding advantage of …rm 1, when …rm 2 is handicapped, is:
However, since we are solving by backward induction, in the …rst stage …rms anticipate that the optimal (e¤ective) quality delivered in the next stage will be 0, therefore we have (0) = 0.
The equilibrium bids, when …rm 1 is handicapped, are given in the following proposition: Proposition 1. Given = h, the equilibrium bids of G are:
the pro…ts of the biders are 1 = max f ; 0g and 2 = max f ; 0g :
Proposition 1 says that, when the handicap is lower than the bidding advantage of …rm 1, the competitive tendering is still awarded to the e¢ cient …rm that bids a price equal to the …xed cost of …rm 2 minus the handicap. In other words, when the score of the e¢ cient …rm is reduced by an exogenous amount, then …rm 1 needs to reduce its price by the same amount (bid more aggressively) in order to recover the score lost and keep winning the tendering.
To …nd the equilibrium bids in the static context we simply consider no handicap (h = 0). In this case …rm 1 wins the competitive tendering and the equilibrium bids are:
In this equilibrium the e¢ cient …rm is able to outbid the rival gaining a pro…t equal to its cost advantage.
On the other hand, the equilibrium bids, when …rm 2 is handicapped, are given in the Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Given e = + h, the equilibrium bids of G are:
the pro…ts of the biders are e 1 = e and e 2 = 0:
When …rm 2 is handicapped the bidding advantage of …rm 1 is higher than in the previous case. Handicapping the less e¢ cient …rm is equivalent to increase the score of the e¢ cient one, then, in equilibrium, …rm 1 increases its bid (with respect to the case of no handicap) by an amount equal to the handicap of the rival. In this equilibrium the e¢ cient …rm still wins the competitive tendering and also increases its pro…t.
THE DYNAMIC GAME
In this section we introduce the dynamic game as an in…nitely repetition of the static game G. Since t = 1 on, the equilibrium of G depends on h, then in what follows we anticipate three possible equilibria of G according to h.
The role of handicapping
When …rm 1 is handicapped and both bid the same level of quality, then its bidding advantage is = h. The di¤erence in the …xed costs measures the asymmetry among competitors and it denotes the upper bound level of handicap that makes the e¢ cient …rm be awarded the contract. In other words, the level of h can be also seen as a increase in the …xed cost of …rm 1. In particular, when h = , handicapping …rm 1 makes both competitors alike and the bidding advantage is exactly compensated. A level h < makes …rm 1 still more e¢ cient, whereas h > replicates the scenario in which …rm 1 has a higher …xed cost than …rm 2. Let us consider the following cases A, B and C.
A) h <
:…rm 1 wins the competitive tendering and the equilibrium is:
In this scenario the handicap is not harsh enough to switch contractors. In particular, when …rm 1 is handicapped by h, then the bid p A 1 = would make the e¢ cient …rm outbided by …rm 2.
B) h =
:nobody wins the competitive tendering, however the most e¢ cient …rm (…rm 1) is awarding the contract by the tie-breaking rule. The equilibrium is: p
Note that in this scenario the handicap makes the bidders symmetric.
C) h > : …rm 2 wins the competitive tendering and the equilibrium is:
This higher level of handicap induces to switch contractors. The e¢ cient …rm is no longer able to outbid the less e¢ cient one that wins the competitive tendering by bidding less aggressively than in A) and B). In the next section we will use scenario C as benchmark to study the trade-o¤ from handicapping: although a su¢ ciently high handicap may give incentive not to shrink, it may implicitly awards the contract to the less e¢ cient …rm that wins the next competitive tendering by bidding less aggressively.
The following Corollary de…nes the equilibrium bids of the stage game when the contractor decides to deliver the quality q and no handicapping is applied. Corollary 1. In the stage game, when no handicap is applied, …rm 1 wins the competitive tendering even though it will deliver q at the last stage. The equilibrium bids remain p 1 = p 1 = .
Corollary 1 shows that even thought …rm 1 decided to ful…ll the quality requirement it would win the tendering by still bidding p 1 = . We will use this result to de…ne the pro…t gained by the contractor in the dynamic game when no opportunistic behavior arises.
The repeated game
Let G 1 be the supergame obtained by an in…nite repetition of the game G. We assume that and are …xed over time. Let be the discount factor common to the …rms and the buyer. Let H t be the common knowledge vector of previous actions undertaken by the players in period up to t 1. Also, let H 0 be the history at time 0. Consider now the following speci…cations of the history given in the following de…nitions.
Definition 1. Let b
H t be the history at time t such that up to the second stage of time t the contractor produces q and no handicap has occurred.
Definition 2. Let e
H t be the history at time t such that up to time t 1 the contractor produces q and no handicap has occurred.
Given the history in De…nitions 1-2, in the De…nition 3-5 we anticipate the "stick and carrot" strategies pioneered in Abreu (1986) If the buyer deviates from its strategy and …rm 1 is handicapped even thought it delivers q, then …rm 1 decides to deliver q for one period, after which revert to q.
Definition 5. Let s
In this setting the presence of the less e¢ cient …rm serves as threat for the most e¢ cient one who in general would win the competitive tendering and deliver the service.
Given Corollary 1, the static pro…t for …rm 1 when s
That is, …rm 1 wins the competitive tendering by bidding p 1 = and providing q. Firm 1 still gains positive pro…t even bidding a price equal to the …xed cost of …rm 2 and providing quality q.
Its discounted payo¤ is:
The discounted pro…t for the buyer is:
When …rm 1 respects the quantity q, the buyer gains exactly q and rewards the contractor with a payment equal to the bided price ( ).
In line with the "Folk theorem" the enforcement of strategies s A) h . Let h A be a level of handicap at most equal to . In this scenario …rm 1 still wins the competitive tendering and the static equilibrium bids and pro…ts are 8 : 8 We recall that when h A = …rm 1 wins the competitive tendering by the tie-breaking rule.
Now in the following Lemma we introduce a necessary condition for a SNE to exist. According to Abreu (1986) the necessary conditions for the strategies s and s 2 t to characterize a SNE are: i) the contractor weakly prefers to respect the minimum quality requirement and the buyer never handicaps (incentive compatibility constraint), and ii) the punishment strategy is credible: once the game ends up in the punishment phase then the players e¤ectively acts as explained in s e A and q h.
Although handicapping is such that the most e¢ cient …rm keeps winning the competitive tendering, cheating is not a so optimum strategy as it seems. There are two e¤ects working at this level: cheating on q will directly increase the utility of the contractor, nevertheless this handicap will induce the e¢ cient …rm to bid a lower price in order to win the next competitive tenderings. When the variable cost of producing q is su¢ ciently low then the gain from cheating on q is also low. In this case, …rm 1 prefers not to cheat at t = 0 by gaining the "cooperative" pro…t over time rather than cheating and winning the next competitive tenderings at a lower price. The only condition for the buyer to respect its strategy is that the handicap is at most equal to the required quality, regardless to the discount factor. Given the bid in (32), the handicap represents the gain for the buyer in terms of more aggressive bidding: when …rm 1 does not deliver quality it is handicapped and its equilibrium bids is decreasing in h. Hence, when the gain from respecting the agreement (q) is at least equal to the gain from handicapping (h), then the buyer never deviates from its strategy.
B) h > : Let h B be a level of handicap strictly higher than . In this scenario …rm 2 wins the competitive tendering and the static equilibrium is:
Lemma 2. When h > , the e¢ cient …rm never respects s
Since a too harsh handicap does not induce the most e¢ cient …rm to deliver q, the strategies in de…nition 1-3 will never characterize a SNE under h B . Thus the only handicap we can consider is h A . However, to show that the handicap h A is a SNE we need to check for the credibility of s b t . The following Proposition shows that the credible level of handicap is h = .
Proposition
1 in which, in every period, the e¢ cient …rm is awarded the contract and it delivers q. Proposition 3 highlights the trade o¤ from handicapping by showing that a strong handicap, as deterrence for moral hazard on quality, does not bene…t the buyer when the contract is awarded by a competitive tendering. In particular, the best strategy for the buyer is to punish the cheating e¢ cient …rm by choosing a level of handicap that makes the heterogeneous competitors more symmetric. A handicap higher than the bidding advantage of the e¢ cient …rm makes the buyer worse o¤ because of two e¤ects. First, the less e¢ cient supplier wins the next competitive tendering by bidding less aggressively and providing zero quality. Second, this behavior induces the e¢ cient …rm to behave opportunistically: it prefers to lose the tendering for one period but be reawarded the contract at less aggressive conditions when …rm 2 is handicapped.
Proposition 3 shows that the optimal handicapping strategy also depends on the degree of asymmetry among competitors. Consider the handicap h = . It is straightforward to see that the e¢ cient contractor's willingness to delivery q is increasing in 9 . When competitors are very asymmetric the buyer needs a harsh handicap to make more e¤ective the threat of switching contractor and induce the e¢ cient …rm to deliver q 10 .
CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides a solution to deter ex post moral hazard in repeated procurement when the quality delivered by the contractor is not veri…able by a third part. We have considered a framework in which a long-run relationship between a buyer and an e¢ cient seller is built on a series of short-run contracts. In principle, the presence of a less e¢ cient supplier puts an upper bound to the incumbent seller's per-period pro…t. However, the e¢ cient seller may be tempted to increase its pro…t by not delivering the agreed level of (unveri…able) quality.
We have then explored how the buyer would optimally use a discipline device that consists in altering at her discretion the incumbent seller's score in subsequent competitive tendering (handicapping). In other words, what would happen if the buyer could resort to an indirect punishment device that goes through the modi…cation of the "playing …eld" between the two competitors? Our answer is that extreme forms of punishment are never credible, that is, it is never in the buyer's 9 We recall that, under h A = , the condition for the e¢ cient …rm to deliver q is
.
Given 2 [0; 1], the willingness to respect q is 1
, that is increasing in . 1 0 In the extreme case of symmetry ( = 0) the threat of switching contractor by making competitors more alike does not work and the e¢ cient …rm behaves opportunistically. However, by assuming > + (q), we rule out the case of perfect symmetry because, when = 0, the pro…t of the contractor would be 1 < 0.
interest to kick the deviant incumbent out of the playing …eld. The buyer's optimal strategy is, rather, to perfectly level the playing …eld for once if the incumbent had deviated from the cooperative strategy (i.e., deliver the agreed level of quality).
There are at least two directions for further investigation. First, we have implicitly assumed that both the buyer and the incumbent contractor observe a perfectly correlated signal about delivered quality. It would be worth testing the robustness of our predictions when the two signals are imperfectly correlated as in McLeod (2003) . Secondly, the assumption of complete information about …rms' e¢ ciency levels is instrumental to buyer for …ne-tuning the optimal handicapping strategy. When the buyer is uncertain about …rms'costs the former has to rely on equilibrium bids to learn about …rms'e¢ ciency levels. The interaction between learning and handicapping certainly deserves a closer attention.
APPENDIX

Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. See B&C (2004) . The di¤erence with their paper is that our bidding advantage collapses to = h because we assume a …xed q instead of a continuos quality. Also, di¤erently from B&C, in our model quality and price are chosen sequentially and not simultaneous, therefore by backward induction we have q = 0 in the equilibrium price.
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Proposition 1 shows that …rm 1 always wins the competitive tendering when both …rms at the …rst stage make their bids anticipating that they will not deliver quality at the second stage. Hence, to prove Corollary 1 it remains to show that …rm 1 wins the competitive tendering even when it anticipate to deliver q. Consider that the most aggressive bid by …rm 2 is p 2 = , that is the price bided when …rm 2 anticipates that it will not deliver quality. When …rm 1 wants to deliver quality q, since > (q), it may win the competitive tendering and gain a positive pro…t with all the bids from + (q) to . Thus, it is possible to see that the only equilibrium when …rm 1 decides to deliver q is p 1;2 = .
The proof of Proposition 2 follows the proof of Proposition 1, then we omit it.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. Since, given h A , …rm 2 always bids p A 2 and never wins the competitive tendering, we can consider only the strategy of …rm 1 and the buyer. We consider the repeated game starting at t = 0 and sketch the proof over two points. 1) Firstly, consider …rm 1. When …rm 1 cheats its discounted pro…t is:
At time t = 0, if …rm 1 cheats and produces q = 0, it gains 1 . At t = 1, according to s b t , the handicap is applied. In this case, …rm 1 still wins the competitive tendering but a more aggressive price, then it gains A 1 . Since t = 2 on, no handicap is applied and …rm 1 reverts to q by gaining 1 . Hence, the condition for …rm 1 not to cheat on quality is:
that holds when:
To characterize a SNE we also need to show that the punishment strategy of …rm 1 is credible. This means that …rm 1 should not deviate from his strategy once the punishment phase gets started. The punishment de…ned in s 1 t (that is, …rm 1 delivers q = 0 only for one period and then reverts to q) is credible when …rm 1 has not incentive to deviate from q = 0 during the period of the punishment. Nevertheless, since q = 0 is its best reply in the static game, then during the punishment …rm 1 does not deviate from q = 0. Hence, s 1 t is credible and the necessary condition for s 1 t to characterize a SNE is e A . Moreover, it is possible to see that without the assumption 2 (q) < h A we have e A > 1. This implies that, in this case, strategy s 1 t cannot characterize a SNE because …rm 1 never delivers q 12 .
2) Second, consider the buyer. When the punishment, as de…ned in s b t and s 1 t , starts, then the e¤ective quality is zero for one period and then it reverts to q. The discounted utility of the buyer if she deviates is:
If at time t = 0 the buyer deviates and decide to handicap …rm 1 even thought it has delivered q, she receive q, pays and her pro…t is q . At time t = 1, under h A , …rm 1 wins the competitive tendering at price p steps. 1) Firstly, we show that in every period of the repeated game …rm 2 always delivers q (it never delivers a positive quality). Assume that …rm 2 delivers q; in this case it gains 2 = h B + (q); however, according to the strategy s b t , no handicap will be applied, then …rm 2 will lose the next competitive tendering. On the other hand, if …rm 2 delivered q = 0 it would gain B 2 as in (39); in this case …rm 2 will be handicapped and it will lose the next competitive tendering as well. Hence, given 2 < B 2 , …rm 2 always cheats on quality under h B . 2) Secondly, consider …rm 1. We shows that …rm 1 always prefers to cheat on quality (deliver q = 0) instead of delivering q. Given the result in point 1, by Proposition 2 the bidding advantage of …rm 1 becomes e = + h B . Thus, the equilibrium bids in (15)-(16) implies that …rm 1 wins the competitive tendering by bidding p 1 = +h B . Let e 1;q denote the pro…t …rm 1 gains by bidding p 1 = + h B and providing q, with:
Deviation entails that …rm 1 produces q (q = 0) for one period and then revert to q. Hence, when …rm 1 deviates its discounted pro…t is:
If …rm 1 deviates at t = 0 its current pro…t is 1 . At t = 1 it will be handicapped and the competitive tendering will be won by …rm 2, then …rm 1 gains zero. By point 1, we know that …rm 2 always delivers q = 0, then it will be handicapped as well at time t = 1 14 . At time t = 2, …rm 1 wins again the competitive tenderings at price p 1 = + h B . Since t = 2 on …rm 1 reverts to q, then it gains e 1;q at t = 2 and 1 since t = 3 on. The condition for …rm 1 to always deliver q is:
(47) that never holds for every 2 [0; 1] 15 . Furthermore, the threat of …rm 1 is credible because in the period of punishment it delivers q = 0, that is its short-run best reaction.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Given the results in Lemma 1-2, the last step to characterize a SNE is showing which level of h A is a credible punishment for the buyer. The punishment is credible when, given the choice of the contractor, the action played by the buyer really represents her best reply. Hence, the credible punishment is the level of h allowing the buyer the highest utility given that the contractor has cheated. Since, by Lemma 2, s b t , s 1 t and s 2 t cannot characterize a SNE under h B , in order to …nd 1 4 We recall that handicapping at time t = 1 entails that the reduction in the score will be applied on the scoring rule at time t = 2. 
